Assessing the Iran Blockade
As the United States blockades the Islamic Republic of Iran in hopes of getting Tehran to capitulate, neither side seems to be willing to back down, with both sides infringing on each other’s red lines. Vice President JD Vance, leading the American negotiating team in Pakistan before talks collapsed on April 12, 2026, declared plainly that Iran “had chosen not to accept our terms.” As the Iranians view their performance in the previous month of war as winning a costly victory, they straightforwardly refused the Americans’ “excessive” demands. Tehran has also offered to suspend nuclear activity for a period of five years - past President Trump’s tenure - a move to which the United States demanded Iran to raise to 20.
Both parties went into the talks mediated by Pakistan with demands that the other is unlikely to accept. The Iranian delegation most notably insisted on the control of the Strait of Hormuz by charging a “toll fee,” not unlike the ones Egypt or Panama have in the Suez or Panama Canal. Iran also wanted the United States and Israel to issue assurances that it would not be attacked again with China and Russia as guarantors, lifting of all sanctions on the Islamic Republic, a right to nuclear enrichment, and perhaps most unrealistically, the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East. The U.S. terms for Iran, although less clear, purportedly included an end to Iranian aid for Hezbollah, allowing ships unmolested passage through the Strait of Hormuz, a permanent halt in nuclear enrichment, and an end to ballistic missile development.
As the nascent blockade is just in its initial stage, it remains to be seen whether the United States would strictly enforce the blockade - especially in regards to China. Ship tracking data shows that four ships linked to Iran transited the Strait of Hormuz yesterday. The United States is reluctant to abandon its fragile economic truce with China, particularly before President Trump’s state visit in May and in face of domestic issues concerning the cost of goods. If Chinese ships are indeed allowed to transfer across the Strait, the blockade would essentially be pointless, given that the People’s Republic of China purchases up to 90% of Iran’s oil and thus provides most of the Iranian government’s revenue.
Iran, which has always been skeptical of the United States since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, is even less willing to trust Washington this time in negotiations. It views Washington’s moves as mere gestures and believes that the United States and Israel are bound to come back for a third round of attacks, parallel to the Israeli metaphor of “mowing the grass” in regards to Jerusalem’s military doctrine in the Gaza Strip.
To the Gulf states, namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, Iran represents a dangerous thorn to the diversification and long term security of their economy. The Gulf countries have been attempting to diversify their oil-dominated economies, branching out into the sectors of finance, tourism, and artificial intelligence. Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Gulf states throughout the past month, however, have shown that this economic model is not sustainable without a permanent neutralization of Iran, a key reason behind the Gulf’s increased involvement towards the cessation of the past round of hostilities and the urging from Gulf monarchies for President Trump to decisively defeat Iran.
All signs currently point to a resumption of war once the ceasefire expires on April 22nd. There simply are too many colliding forces for a resumption of the status quo before the war. The Iranians, in their terms, are determined to effectively become the region’s hegemon while the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states are determined to halt their ambitions.
